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Since Lucas(1987) measuring the welfare costs of business cycle °uctuations has been
an on going challenge carrying on important policy implications. Low business cycle
costs would suggest that it's not e±cient for society to devote more resources to further
stabilize consumption since the bene¯ts would be modest even with the same policies. On
the other hand, producing evidence that the postwar business cycles were costly doesn't
directly imply that a further stabilization is desirable or possible. Still, it encourages
researchers and policymakers to look for new channels through which economic policies
could e®ectively reduce the residual cyclical °uctuations and produce relevant welfare
bene¯ts. Using a business cycle model with time additive log preferences and serially
uncorrelated consumption °uctuations, Lucas(1987) calculated that individuals would be
willing to sacri¯ce at most .1% of their lifetime consumption for policies devoted to remove
the residual amount of business cycle risk. Since then, various researchers have revisited
Lucas's calculation looking for new evidence of larger welfare costs, focusing on two aspects
of his stylized model: the absence of persistent aggregate consumption °uctuations and
the presence of counterfactual implications for asset market facts.
Reis(2005) points out that assuming no serial correlation in the consumption °uctu-
ations substantially reduces the amount of busyness cycle risk and its associated cost.
He then shows empirically also that consumption is actually very persistent and it's not
possible to reject the existence of a unit root (as in Hall(1980)).
Mehra-Prescott(1985) and the subsequent literature about the equity premium puzzle
have largely documented that CRRA preferences - workhorse in benchmark business cycle
models - cannot produce Sharpe-Ratios as high as the ones observed in the data unless
the relative risk aversion coe±cient is calibrated to incredibly high values in turn implying
approximately even one hundred times bigger welfare costs for business cycles.
In a model with standard time additive CRRA preferences it's impossible to reconcile
business cycle and asset market facts.1 The implied measure of the welfare costs is crucially
a®ected by the preferences of the researchers. Those ones that - like Lucas(1987) - choose
to give more importance to the aggregate quantities properties, calibrate the risk aversion
to low values and report lower welfare costs. Those ones that care for the equity premium,
instead, calibrate the risk aversion coe±cient to larger values and ¯nd higher costs.
1Rouwenhorst(1995) shows that a production economy with standard time-additive CRRA
preferences cannot solve the puzzle since when the risk aversion is high the consumption process
becomes too smooth.
1Tallarini(2000) o®ers a partial resolution to this problem by studying the costs of
uncertainty in a production economy where productivity follows an exogenous stochastic
trend and the representative agent has Epstein-Zin-Weil(1989) preferences with elasticity
of intertemporal substitution equal to one. The relative risk aversion and the subjective
discount factor are calibrated in order to match the level of the market Sharpe-ratios and
the real interest rate observed in the data. He is able to match simultaneously several key
features of both the aggregate quantities and the market returns. He ¯nds very high costs
ranging from 13% to 10283%, but these results are mostly due to the fact that he doesn't
solve the equity premium puzzle.2
The main challenge of this paper is to measure the welfare costs of business cycles in
a production economy in which the representative agent has low risk aversion and - at
the same time - the equity premium and the co-movement of the aggregate quantities are
comparable to what is observed in historical data. For this reason, I follow a recent ¯nance
literature that has proposed a new possible resolution for the equity premium puzzle. I
consider an economy in which the representative agent cares for the timing of resolution
of uncertainty according to Epstein-Zin-Weil(1989) preferences and consumption is simul-
taneously a®ected by two di®erent sources of uncertainty. In particular, I assume that
aggregate consumption has a unit root and that its drift is subject to small but very per-
sistent deviations from its unconditional mean. This source of uncertainty takes the name
of Long Run Risk since it produces low frequency °uctuations whose volatility is almost
negligible over a short horizon but is bigger over long horizons. Although it's di±cult to
identify such a small Long Run Risk component from consumption data (Hansen-Heaton-
Li(2005)), several recent papers show that this might be a reasonable assumption in light
of the sensible improvements that such models a®ord in explaining key features of asset
data.3 For example, Bansal-Yaron(2004) show that in an exchange economy with Long
Run Risk and Epstein-Zin-Weil(1989) preferences it is possible to reconcile consumption
and asset prices properties with low risk aversion and an elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution slightly bigger than one.4 Their results might suggest, at ¯rst, that the implied
costs of uncertainty should be low due to the fact they manage to keep risk aversion to a
low level. However, studying a benchmark exchange economy I show that trading o® risk
2In Tallarini(2000) the risk aversion coe±cient ranges from 45 to 180).
3See Bansal-Gallant-Taucken(2004), Hansen-Heaton-Li(2005), Bansal-Dittmar-
Lundblad(2005), Parker-Juillard(2005), Kiku(2005), Bansal-Dittmar-Kiku(2005), Croce-Lettau-
Ludvigson(2005).
4Basanl-Yaron(2004) calibrate their risk aversion in the range [7.5 10]. Colacito-Croce(2005)
manage to calibrate their relative risk aversion coe±cient to an even lower level, 4.25.
2aversion with Long Run Risk in order to match the historical equity premium produces
even higher welfare costs that range from 11% to ???%. A calibration in which risk aver-
sion is low, in fact, requires a large amount of Long Run Risk in order to match the assets
market data. Focusing also on the role of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
I show that agents that are more willing to substitute current consumption with future
consumption experience higher welfare losses similarly to what found in Obstfeld(1994).
Although I have still to complete the analysis of the welfare costs in the production
economy, these preliminary results suggest that it's di±cult to produce a low costs of
consumption °uctuations once one commits to take asset prices data seriously. In the
production economy, I introduce Long Run Risk in the productivity growth rate and
capital adjustment cost as in Jerman(1997) in order to match the volatility of the market
price-dividend ratio and the market excess returns. As Barlevy(2003) points out, the
welfare loss of business cycle °uctuations can be quite high in this case. In fact, in order
to match the observed elasticity of the investment-to-capital ratio with respect to the
marginal Tobin's q a high curvature in the adjustment cost function is required. This
implies a reduction of the average growth rate of consumption by between .3 and .5
percentage points. For this reason, in order to isolate the di®erent channels through
which uncertainty produces welfare costs, it's my intention to carefully explore the role
that both the long run risk component and the stochastic trend have on the volatility and
the average growth rate of consumption and investment. Of course, I will give particular
attention to the e®ects of precautionary savings motives on the steady state of the economy
and I will commit to produce asset returns as high and as volatile as those observed in
the data.
A interesting and crucial complication of this analysis is that when the representative
agent has Epstein-Zin-Weil(1989) preferences his continuation values enter the ¯rst order
conditions. So, in order to simulate the model, one has to solve for the value function
¯rst. By setting the intertemporal elasticity of substitution to one, Tallarini(2000) is able
to solve his model by using the methods in Hansen and Sargent(1995). However, Ki-
ley(2001) concludes that "...it is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution that is critical
for quantity °uctuations after a shock...".5 Kiley(2001) and Bansal-Yaron(2004) ¯ndings
suggest that exploring the role of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution has to be an
important step of this analysis and for this reason I adopt a more °exible approximation
5Kiley(2001) uses a very stylized business cycle model with production and Epstein-Zin-
Weil(1989) preferences for which there exists a closed form solution.
3method than Tallarini(2000)'s one.6 This approach, even if computationally intensive, pro-
vides me a laboratory in which to examine simultaneously the implications of Long Run
Risk and preference parameters on basic business cycle facts. This will help me to bridge
the gap between the current Long Run Risk asset pricing literature, in which quantities
are taken as exogenous, and the standard macroeconomic business cycle models.
Reconciling the asset markets fact with the aggregate quantities behavior has proved
a challenge for modern stochastic dynamic general equilibrium models. Jerman(1998),
Lettau-Uhlig(2000), Boldrin-Christiano-Fisher(2001) have proposed models based on pref-
erences with habit formation. In particular, Jerman(1998) is able to produce low risk free
rate, high equity premium, high volatility for the excess returns and relative volatilities
for consumption, investment and output in the order of what observed in the data by
introducing also capital adjustment costs. However, as pointed out in Boldrin-Christiano-
Fisher(2001) and Lettau-Uhlig(2000), his model produces a countercyclically response of
labor to a persistent shock to productivity. Boldrin-Christiano-Fisher(2001) propose a
two sector economy that doesn't generate this counterfactual behavior but, on the other
side, predicts a negative serially correlation for consumption and a too much volatile risk
free rate. By contrast, in Tallarini(2000), the interest rate and the excess returns are too
smooth. Even if the Sharpe-ratios are successfully close to those ones observed in the asset
market, the highest annualized equity premium produced is about .44%. A production
economy with long run risk and Epstein-Zin-Weil(1989) preferences is instead potentially
able to match both the level and the volatility of the risk free rate and the market returns
once adjustment costs are introduced in order to allow °uctuations of the price of capital.
On the other hand, looking at the business cycles welfare costs literature, this paper
extends the analysis of Obstfeld(1994) studying also long run consumption °uctuations
both in an exchange economy and a production economy and relates also to Alvarez-
Jerman(2003). Adopting an approach that doesn't require the speci¯cation of preferences
and that instead uses just asset prices, they show that low frequencies consumption °uctu-
ations can be much more costly than °uctuations corresponding to business cycle frequen-
cies. Their ¯ndings look consistent with the preliminary results found in the exchange
economy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the relevance of
the preferences parameters for the welfare costs and the asset market implications in an
exchange economy. In Section 3 I present the growth model, I show the e®ect of the long
6See Carroll(2005) and Barillas-Fern¶ andez-Villaverde(2005).
4run risk on the consumption, investment and labor. I compute the welfare costs with
production and I study the role of relative risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. Section 4 concludes.
2 The exchange economy
2.1 Economy setup
I study an economy in which time is discrete and there is a representative agent who has














































In order to study the properties of this economy I need to specify the consumption process.
In an endowment economy, thanks to the feasibility condition, consumption will be equal
to the exogenous endowment process. I assume that there is no storage technology and
that the aggregate endowment has no durable component and I model the consumption
growth rate7 as in Bansal-Yaron(2004):8
¢ct+1 = ¹ + xt + ¾²c
t (3)

















7From now on, I adopt the convention of denoting log-variables in small letters. For example,
ct+1 = logCt+1, mt+1 = logMt+1,...
8For a more general speci¯cation see Hansen-Heaton-Li(2005)
5The parameter ½ is calibrated to be close to one while the ratio ¾x
¾ is calibrated in order
to be small so that consumption growth is not highly serially correlated. On the base of
this calibration strategy, the long run component xt is a small but persistent deviation of
the consumption drift from its unconditional mean ¹.
Since I want to take seriously the market returns data, I calibrate the preferences in
order to match the mean and the volatility of the risk free rate and the excess returns in
the post-war US data. While the model speci¯ed in (1)-(5) gives precise implications for
the risk free rate and the asset paying consumption, it doesn't give any idea of how an
asset that pays dividends should be priced. In order to take into account these elements,
similarly to Bansal-Yaron(2004), I assume that the growth rate of dividends evolves in the
following way:9




































The parameters (¾d;Á;Ác) allow me to calibrate the overall volatility of dividends and its
correlation with consumption. The parameters (Á;Ác) determine the relative importance
of the idiosyncratic shock ²c
t+1 and the long run component.
I assume that the securities markets are complete in order to have a simple asset
pricing model. Let V d
t denote the ex-dividend price-dividend ratio of a claim to an asset
that pays a dividend stream growing as in (6)-(7), and let V c
t denote the ex-dividend
price-consumption ratio of a share of a claim to the aggregate consumption stream. From




































9Dividends are a sub-component of the total endowment, the residual part corresponds to labor
income.









Finally, I need to specify the information set of the agent. For simplicity, I focus on the
benchmark case in which the agent has full information:





The agent observes not only the dividends and consumption growth but also their speci¯c
components.10
2.2 The costs of uncertainty
2.2.1 De¯nitions
I de¯ne the cost of uncertainty as the percentage increase of consumption ¤ > 0 that one
has to give to the agent in every period and along every history in order to make him
indi®erent between the consumption process fCig and a less risky consumption process
fCjg:
U(f(1 + ¤)Cig) = U(fCjg)
Let uj denote the log of the utility-consumption ratio for the generic consumption process
fCjg, the following holds:
¸ ´ log(1 + ¤) = uj ¡ ui (10)
In order to have a measure of the cost, all I have to do is to compute the value of the
utility-consumption ratio in log units for the two di®erent consumption process and cal-
culate their di®erence.
In the economy described above, given any calibration for f¹;¾;¾xg there are three dif-
10A di®erent information structure is analyzed in Croce-Lettau-Ludvigson(2005)
7ferent consumption processes I look at:11
Ctr : ¢ct+1 = ¹
Cid : ¢ct+1 = ¹ + ¾²c
t+1
Clr : ¢ct+1 = ¹ + ¾²c
t+1 + xt
The total cost of uncertainty can be computed by comparing the utility that the agent
would have in an economy with consumption fCtrg with that one associated to the process
fClrg:
¸Tot = utr ¡ ulr (11)
This cost can be decomposed in two parts. The cost of the idiosyncratic risk is:
¸id = utr ¡ uid (12)
and, simply by di®erence, the cost of the long run risk is ¸Tot ¡ ¸id, equivalent to:
¸lr = uid ¡ ulr (13)
2.2.2 The special case ª = 1
The case in which ª = 1 is interesting for two di®erent reasons: the ¯rst one is that this
is what Lucas(1987) has assumed12 and the second one is that it's possible to get an exact
solution for the value function.


















¹ + :5(1 ¡ °)U2
u¾2
x + :5(1 ¡ °)¾2¤
(16)
11Here, "tr" stands for trend, "id" for iid uncertainty, "lr" for uncertainty with long run risk.
12When ª = 1 the Epstein-Zin-Weil(1989) aggregator collapses into a log function.
8Let ¹L denote the unconditional mean of the consumption growth rate E[Ct+1=Ct]; in
order to preserve this mean I impose:






1 ¡ ½2) (17)
Using (11)-(17) I get:














Tallarini(2000) has discussed (18). I want to study (19). From the formulas above we
see that the magnitude of the two costs depend crucially on the relative risk aversion °
and the subjective discount factor coe±cient ±. It's possible to obtain the following simple







Here we see two di®erent forces at work: the persistence and the relative magnitude of




¾2), the smaller its relative cost is. On the other side, the closer ½ is to unity,
the higher the ratio of the costs is.
The choice of parameters for the long run component will be very important for the
measure of the welfare costs. I decide to calibrate ½ = :979 as in Bansal-Yaron(2004)
in order to match the serial correlation of the price-dividend ratio13 and will remain
unaltered through my analysis. Using the quarterly real consumption of non-durable and
services from B.E.A., from 1948:02 to 2005:02, I ¯nd that the annualized volatility of the
consumption growth rate is about 1:2% while its ¯rst auto correlation is about 20%. These
two moments are enough to calibrate f¾;¾xg. As in Bansal-Yaron(2004), I assume that
the agent decision horizon is monthly and I calibrate my model at a monthly frequency,
but I decide to target the quarterly statistics. In order to keep the analysis simple, I
prefer to take into account the time aggregation e®ect by MonteCarlo simulations. So,
given a calibration for f¾;¾xg, I simulate the consumption growth rate over a sample
13Equation (25) shows why the serial correlation of the price-dividend ratio depends on the
persistence of xt.
9of 840 months, I recover the consumption series in levels by normalizing C(0) = 1, I
aggregate the consumption process over quarters and I compute the quarterly growth rate
over a sample of length 280. At this point I compute the sample mean and the sample
standard deviation of the quarterly growth rate and I repeat this procedure 500 times.
Finally I look at the average of both the two sample statistics. In Table 1 I report my
benchmark calibration, the moments I want to match, their values in the data and the
results from the simulations of the model. In order to keep the autocorrelation of the
quarterly consumption growth low, the volatility of the long run component has to be
small (in fact in this calibration ¾x = 2%¾).
For a given f½;¾;¾xg, I am now able to study the role of the two preference parameters
f°;±g. In ¯gure 1, I plot the welfare cost of the i.i.d. consumption shock and the total
cost of uncertainty with respect to the aversion coe±cient and the subjective discount
factor. Under the benchmark calibration ¸lr=¸id is about 70% and this explains why
¸Tot ¼ 2¸id. This is anticipating that to trading o® risk aversion with Long Run Risk will
not necessarily reduce the total cost of uncertainty. All of the cost functions are increasing
in the relative risk aversion parameter and the subjective discount factor, especially when
the latter approaches the value of 1. Finally, it's worth noticing that in the range of the
parameters plotted in Figure 1, the total cost of uncertainty is always above 5% and this
is a quite high number if compared to those obtained by Lucas(1987). In the next section
I study the impact that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution can have on the cost
functions.
2.2.3 ª 6= 1
The role of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is interesting for at least two rea-
sons: ¯rst, from an empirical point of view, whether the elasticity is bigger or smaller than
one is still a debate; second, standard business cycle models with time-additive C.E.S.
preferences usually adopt ª = 1=° < 1, while Bansal-Yaron(2004), Colacito-Croce(2004),
Croce-Lettau-Ludvigson(2005) need ª > 1 to match key features of the assets market
data. When the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is di®erent from one it's impos-
sible to ¯nd an exact solution for the utility-consumption ratios, however it's possible
to approximate them. Hansen-Heaton-Lee(2005) approximate the utility function around
ª = 1 by a quadratic expansion. Bansal-Yaron(2004), instead, log-linearize the model. In
¯gure 2 I show that the results are similar for both approximation methods and, more-
over, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution has a strong positive e®ect on the welfare
10costs. This is a genuine feature of Epstein-Zin-Weil(1989) stressed also in Obstfeld(1994).
Focusing on the case in which consumption is a martingale, Obstelf(1994) is able to get a
closed form solution for the costs of the consumption °uctuations and shows that the costs
can be expressed as a function of the e®ective growth and the e®ective discount rate of
the representative agent. While the coe±cient of risk aversion enters the e®ective growth
rate with negative sign and adjusts consumption growth according with its volatility, a
higher intertemporal elasticity of substitution increases the e®ective discount factor con-
tributing to rise the welfare costs. A particular interesting case is that one of indi®erence
to the timing of uncertainty that is obtained when ª = 1=°. Under this condition the
Epstein-Zin preferences are equivalent to standard time separable CES preferences with
risk aversion coe±cient °. The results just obtained suggest that the CES utility func-
tion should produce lower costs since higher risk aversion will be associated with a lower
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Figure 3 shows what happens to the welfare costs
when preferences are time separable. The risk aversion coe±cient ranges from .5 to 60
and the results are based on the log-linearization of the model.14
First of all, it's important to notice that for high values of the relative risk aversion
the welfare costs are lower than before by two orders of magnitude. The costs are higher
than those ones reported in Lucas(1987), but that's due to the fact that in my experiment
log consumption is integrated of order one, while in the Lucas computations consumption
is trend stationary.
With this preferences the agent doesn't discount anymore future payo® according
with the continuation value of this utility and for this reason the costs of uncertainty are
lower. It's interesting to notice that the costs of the long run component and that of the
idiosyncratic shock are no longer proportional to each other. Moreover, the costs of the
Long Run Risk are negative for low values of the relative risk aversion (higher values of
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution).
[THE BEHAVIOR OF THE COST OF THE LONG RUN COMPONENT HAS TO
BE EXPLAINED BETTER. I HAVE TO ADD HERE THE COMPUTATIONS OF THE
WELFARE COSTS FOR THE BASIC CES CASE SIMILAR TO OBSTFELD(1994).]
14The Hansen-Heaton-Li(2005) quadratic approximation is accurate only for values of the IES
very close to 1.
112.3 Asset market implications
2.3.1 The special case ª = 1
Under the assumption that ª = 1, it's possible to ¯nd exact solutions for the stochastic
discount factor, the risk free rate and the price-consumption ratio:
m1
t+1 = ¹m ¡ xt ¡ °¾²c
t+1 + (1 ¡ °)Uu¾x²x
t+1 (20)


















t+1 = ¡log(±) + ¢ct+1 (24)
In order to have predictions for the market price-dividend ratio and the market's excess
returns I log-linearize as Bansal-Yaron(2004):15
vd
t ´ log(V d
t ) ¼ a0 + a1xt
rd




The model implies the following variance and mean for the excess returns:
Vt(rex
t+1) = (Ác¾)2 + ¾2
d + (·ma1¾x)2 (25)
E[rex






The economic intuition behind this asset pricing model has already been largely explained
by Bansal-Yaron(2004), so I will underline just two particular features that a®ect the
welfare costs. Equation (22) shows that the unconditional mean of the risk free rate
decreases if the relative risk aversion coe±cient increases. So, when it's possible to match
the equity premium with a low risk aversion coe±cient, a higher subjective discount factor
is needed in order to keep the risk free rate level on line with the data. This generates
an important tension on the costs of uncertainty since I have already shown that a higher
subjective discount factor increases the welfare loss, while a lower risk aversion reduces it.
15·m ´ exp(a0)=(1+exp(a0)), a1 = (Á¡1)=(1¡·m½) and a0 is found by numerical integration
methods.
12The second term in equation(26), instead, shows that it's possible to have low risk aversion
and a high equity premium if the volatility of the long run shock ¾x is high enough. Once
again, there are two forces simultaneously at work pushing the welfare costs in di®erent
directions.
I am now ready to calibrate the risk aversion coe±cient and the individual discount
factor by simulating the model and making sure it produces statistics as close as possible
to those ones observed in the data. In Table 2 and Table 3 I show two di®erent calibrations
for two opposite scenarios. In the ¯rst scenario, that I denote as LLR, the Long Run Risk
is a®ecting both the consumption and the dividend growth and it's the only component
responsible for their contemporaneous correlation (I impose Ác = 0). In the the second
scenario, denoted as IID, both the consumption and the dividend growth rate are perfectly
i.i.d. over a monthly frequency and their correlation is totally due to the short run risk
component Ác²c
t+1.
In the economy with with long run risk the total welfare costs are about 2.5 times those
ones computed in the IID economy despite of the fact that the risk aversion is calibrated
at a lower level. Perhaps, the most surprising thing is that in the IID case the costs
of the idiosyncratic shock are lower by about 1% than in the LRR case. That's due to
the fact that in economy with Long Run Risk the discount factor of the agent has to be
calibrated at an higher level in order to match the risk free rate mean. It's also worth to
notice that under the assumption of i.i.d. growth, the price dividend is not °uctuating
over time and the volatility of the returns is for this reason three times smaller than in the
data. In the economy with LRR, instead, the model is much closer to the data. An other
important remark regards the fact that the cost of the long run component reported in
Table 2 can be considered like a lower bound with respect to what assumed in the current
¯nance literature about the Long Run Risk. For example, Bansal-Yaron(2004) calibrate
¾x = 4:4%¾ (in Table 2 ¾x = 2%¾) and, at the same time, keep the serial correlation of
consumption close to what suggested by annual data.16 In the next section I will discuss
the costs implied by their calibration in which the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
is assumed bigger than one.
2.3.2 ª 6= 1
Bansal-Yaron(2005) show that it's possible to get results that match matter the asset
prices data by calibrating the intertemporal elasticity of substitution above one. A log-
16They consider also pre-war data.
13linear approximation of the price-dividend implies that:
vd







By No-Arbitrage, the price-dividend is equal to conditional expected value of all future
discounted dividends. The long run component enters the expected value of both future
dividends (with loading Á) and discount factor (with loading ¡ 1
ª). The coe±cient 1
1¡½·m
captures the fact that dividends are discounted over an in¯nite horizon. A high elasticity
of intertemporal substitution let the the price-dividend ratio be steeper with respect to
the long run component. In this way the dividend claim is riskier and, holding ¯x all the
other parameters, the equity premium is higher.

















The second term in (27) shows how a higher intertemporal elasticity of substitution
helps to maintain low the risk free rate mean despite of consumption growth.17
[TO BE COMPLETED.]
3 The production economy
3.1 Capital accumulation
In this section I present the model I use to study the business cycle and evaluate the
welfare costs. In order to keep the analysis as simple as possible, I ¯rst focus only on
the consumption/saving problem of the representative agent and I assume a constant
labor supply. In section 3.2 I introduce °uctuations in labor and I study its aggregate
co-movements with consumption and investment.
17As long as ª > 1 and ° > 1 the third term in (27) is negative.
143.1.1 The model

























where Kt is the ¯xed stock of capital carried into date t, nt is the labor input at t and
At is an aggregate productivity shock. The productivity growth rate evolves as described
below:
¢at+1 = ¹ + xt + ¾²a;t+1














The resource constraint of this economy is:
Ct + It · Yt
The capital stock evolves according to:























The rate of depreciation of capital is denoted by ±k and the function G(¢) transforms
investment in new capital as in Jerman(1998). When ¿ ¡! +1 there are no adjustment
15costs. When ¿ ¡! 0 the adjustment costs are in¯nite. When ¿ ¡! 0 and ±k = 0 the
production economy collapses to an exchange economy since the capital stock doesn't
move over time and output °uctuations are due only to exogenous productivity shocks.
The agent is endowed with n units of time that he can devote to leisure (denoted by
lt) or labor, i.e.
nt + lt · n;
Since his utility is not a®ected by leisure, the representative agent will always ¯nd
optimal to o®er nt = n units of labor.
3.1.2 Equilibirum
In this economy the allocation that solves the planner's problem can be decentralized by
means of competitive markets (Sargent(2004)). It's then possible to ¯nd the competitive
equilibrium allocation by solving the planner's problem.

















Let st ´ [¢at;xt;kt] denote the vector of the states of the economy. Let u(s) be the
value of the planner's problem evaluated at the optimum for given state s. The planner's




(1 ¡ ±)c1¡ 1












c ¸ 0; k0 ¸ 0
c + i = y ´ e(1¡®)¢ak®n1¡®






x0 = ½x + ¾x²0
x
¢a0 = ¹ + x + ¾²0
a
16Although this problem is similar to that one solved in Tallarini(2001), there are three
basic di®erences. The state space has one extra dimension (the long run component x).
There are adjustment costs in capital. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is not
constrained to be one.18
Prices and returns are derived from the solution to the planning problem as follows.
The marginal value of standardized capital is equal to the marginal rate of transfor-










































The stochastic discount factor takes exactly the same form of that one derived in (2). The























18I solve this problem by numerical methods. See Miranda-Fackler(2002), Judd(2004), Barillas-
Fern¶ andez-Villaverde(2005).




173.1.3 The welfare costs
[To be completed]
3.2 Capital accumulation and endogenous labor supply
3.2.1 The model
[To be completed]





In the paper I use computational methods to solve for the asset prices schedules in the
exchange economy and the planner's problem in the production economy. The following
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21Table 1
Calibration with Long Run Consumption Risk
Moment Data Model
¹L .00164 E[Ct+1=Ct] 2.00% 1.99%
¾ .00405 std[Ct+1=Ct] 1.20% 1.20%
¾x .0081% ACF1[Ct+1=Ct] .20 .23
½ .97900 ACF1[pt ¡ dt] .97 .97
All the statistics are based on quarterly data and are annualized. The entries for the model
are based on 500 simulations each with 840 monthly observations that are time-aggregated
to a quarterly frequency.
22Table 2
Model Calibration: LRR case (ª = 1)
Parameter Value Moment Data Model
¹L .00164 E[Ct+1=Ct] 2.00% 1.99%
¾ .00405 std[Ct+1=Ct] 1.20% 1.20%
¾x .0081% ACF1[Ct+1=Ct] .20 .23
½ .97900 ACF1[pt ¡ dt] .97 .97
¹L
d .0014 E[Dt+1=Dt] 1.84% 1.84%
Á 14 ½¢c;¢d .13 .13
Ác 0 - - -
¾d 1.0125% std[Dt+1=Dt] 4.23 4.23
± .99748 E[r
f
t ] 1.1% 1.06%
° 20 E[rt+1 ¡ r
f
t ] 6.19% 5.95%
- - std[rt+1 ¡ r
f
t ] 16.4% 14.81%
- - std[r
f
t ] 1.35% .4%
¸id ¸lr ¸Tot
Welfare costs: 6.49% 4.46% 10.95%
All the statistics are based on quarterly data and are annualized. The entries for the model
are based on 500 simulations each with 840 monthly observations that are time-aggregated
to a quarterly frequency.
23Table 3
Model Calibration: IID case (ª = 1)
Parameter Value Moment Data Model
¹L .00164 E[Ct+1=Ct] 2.00% 1.99%
¾ .00405 std[Ct+1=Ct] 1.20% 1.20%
¾x 0 ACF1[Ct+1=Ct] .20 .21
½ 0 ACF1[pt ¡ dt] .97 0
¹L
d .0014 E[Dt+1=Dt] 1.84% 1.87%
Á 0 - - -
Ác .4385 ½¢c;¢d .13 .13
¾d 1.3992% std[Dt+1=Dt] 4.23 4.09
± .9953 E[r
f
t ] 1.1% 1.09%
° 25.2 E[rt+1 ¡ r
f
t ] 6.19% 6.13%
- - std[rt+1 ¡ r
f
t ] 16.4% 4.9%
- - std[r
f
t ] 1.35% 0
¸id ¸lr ¸Tot
Welfare costs: 4.57% 0% 4.57%
All the statistics are based on quarterly data and are annualized. The entries for the model
are based on 500 simulations each with 840 monthly observations that are time-aggregated
to a quarterly frequency.































The welfare costs as function of (°;±)
The parameters (¹L;½;¾;¾x) are calibrated to the values reported in Table 1.





























The welfare costs as function of the EIS
The parameters (¹L;½;¾;¾x) are calibrated to the values reported in Table 1. In this
¯gure, ° = 20 and ± = :99748.















The welfare costs in the CES case
The parameters (¹L;½;¾;¾x) are calibrated to the values reported in Table 1. In this
¯gure, ± = :99748.
27